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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

VEIGH CUMMINGS and JoELLEN
CUMMINGS, his wife,
Platntiffs a;nd Appellants,
vs.
J. ELMO ENGLAND, DeLOYD
ENGLAND, AND BOYD E,NGLAND, a partnership, doing business under the name and style of
ENGLAND BROTHERS,
Defendants and Respondents.

No. 9344

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Throughout this Brief, plaintiffs will be referred
to either as plaintiffs or by their individual name. Defendants will be referred to as defendants or by their
individual names, as the case may be. All italics are ours.
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2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a Judgment entered in this
case on the 25th day of August, 1960, which granted to
the defendants judgment against the plaintiffs in the
amount of $2,925.38.

Plaintiffs commenced this action on the 18th of
August, 1959, and sought to obtain an accounting of
funds which were received from the sale of property in
which plaintiffs had an interest. The property was
located in Summit County.

Two separate and distinct accounting features are
involved. An accounting between plaintiffs and the defendants covering a period while the plaintiff operated
the Summit County property under an Agreement dated
the 7th of May, 1958. The agreement provided for the
sharing of expense of operation by the parties.
The Court found that plaintiff paid $1754.11 which
was chargeable to defendant. This finding is satisfactory
to plaintiffs.
The Court determined that plaintiffs were not entitled to share the profits of $15,000.00 made on the sale
of the property by the parties to the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints. From this finding plaintiffs
appeal.
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3
The basic agreement between the parties is Exhibit
7-P. This document entitled "Agreement" is dated the
7th of May, 1958. It provides for the plaintiffs to buy
one-half interest in the real property and covered the
operation of the property during the period that plaintiffs
were paying the purchase price of their one-half interest.
Plaintiffs were in possession of the property on
May 7, 1958 and continued in possession until the sale.
During the summer and fall of 1958, until the time
that the grazing operation ceased plaintiffs paid on
behalf of the joint operation, $3,498.25. One-half of said
payment by the plaintiffs was chargeable to the defendants. In addition to the $1754.11, the Court determined
that the plaintiffs were entitled to $1597.79 by reason
of the original down payment made by plaintiffs in the
amount of $3,000.00, having arrived at the figure of
$1597.79 by deducting interest at 4112% on the unpaid
balance of defendants' contract with one MILLS in the
amount of $35,692.52 as provided in the Contract between
the parties.
The Court thus determined by its findings that there
was due and owing to plaintiffs by reason of the agreement between plaintiffs and defendants and the operation
conducted by plaintiffs on the joint property, $3351.90.
In February of 1959, while the parties were still
jointly operating the property, defendant, Elmo England,
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4
gave an Option to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints to purchase the land covered by the agreement for a price of $75,000.00 (R. 80). He did not disclose the giving of this Option to the plaintiffs (R. 96).
In April of 1959, plaintiffs tendered the semi-annual
payment due in the amount of $1500.00. Defendants
refused to accept it. Exhibit 4-P, a letter dated May 14,
1959, shows the rejection by defendants of plaintiffs'
payment and defendants' attempt to exercise the Option
to Purchase plaintiffs' interest in the property. Even
at this late date defendants do not mention the Option
given the Church on the property.
On the 11th day of September, 1959, the defendants
attempted to pay plaintiffs for their share of the property as provided for in the "Agreement" and purchase
the interest of the plaintiffs in the joint property by
granting a credit of $1595.79. This amount, defendants
claimed was the net amount paid on the purchase contract by plaintiffs. At that time this action had been
filed. Plaintiffs had joined with defendants in the sale
to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and
had received $6.,000.00 out of the sale price.
The payment to plaintiffs was made after an Agreement between the parties dated June 26, 1959. Exhibit
No. 2·5-D. Under that Agreement, defendants received
$30,000.00, and the balance of the Mills Contract was
paid in full in the runount of $35,000.00, plus.
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5
The money remaining from the sale price of $75,000.00, approximately $4,000.00, was held in escrow pending determination by the appropriate Court action for
its distribution.
Plaintiffs were entitled to $3,351.90 the Court determined as result of payments made during the joint
operation. Plaintiffs claim they .are entitled to one-half
of the net profit which was made· from the sale to the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in addition
to the amount found by the Court to be due. Said profit
is the difference between $75,000.00 and the purchase
price of the property recited in the Agreement of May
7th, 1958, namely, $60,000.00.
The Court found that defendants by their Notice
on May 14, 1959, and tender- on the 11th of September
of $1595.59, deprived the plaintiffs of their interest in
the property and their share in the profit made from
the sale of the real property to the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints.
The Court found that there did not exist during the
joint operation of the ranch properties any :fiduciary
relationship between plaintiffs and defendants. That
defendants did not act improperly nor in violation of
any duty to the plaintiffs when they gave to the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints the Option to purchase the property for $75,000.00, and neglected to inform
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6
the plaintiffs of the Option until the June, 1959 negotiations.
It is plaintiffs' position that after the Option was
granted to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints by the defendants in February, 1959, neither
party could then take advantage of that portion of the
Agreement which provided that after twelve months
either party might buy out the other party by tendering
the other party the net amount paid on the purchase
price of the property, by that party.
The Option so changed conditions that it would
be unconscionable, unfair, and unreasonable to permit
either party to purchase the other party's interest for a
small part of its value as determined by the Option
figure.
Plaintiff also objects to the Finding of the Court
that the defendants could purchase plaintiffs' interest
by tendering to plaintiffs $1595.79 at a tin1e when there
was actually due and owing to plaintiffs the sum of
$3351.90 as has been detennined by the Finding of the
Court.
Most of the trial was consun1ed in a discussion and
litigation of the various items of expense which the
plaintiffs paid during the summer and fall of 1958 while
they were operating the joint property of all parties,
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and the Court has found generally in plaintiffs' favor
on these items and determined that there was $1754.11
which was due to plaintiffs from defendants for the
advancement by the plaintiffs of the total cost of operations during the summer. of 1958. This $1754.11 was
$254.11 in excess of the amount necessary for plaintiffs
to pay defendants to make the payment called for under
the Contract due on the 1st of October, 1958.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO VALID OR SUFFICIENT TENDER TO PLAINTIFFS
OF THEIR INVESTED INTERESTS IN THE JOINTLY
OPERATED PROPERTY WAS EVER MADE BY DEFENDANTS.
POINT II
A'T THE TIME OF THE GRANTING OF THE OPTION
TO PURCHASE, AND ITS EXERCISE, PLAINTIFFS AND
DEFENDANTS vVERE JOINT OWNERS OF THE PROPERTY, AND PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF
OF THE NET PROFIT REALIZED ON THE SALE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO VALID OR SUFFICIENT TENDER TO PLAINTIFFS
OF THEIR INVESTED INTERESTS IN THE JOINTLY
OPERATED PROPERTY WAS EVER MADE BY DEFENDANTS.
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On May 14th, 1959, defendants, through their Attorney, attempted to buy the interest that the plaintiffs
had in the property by virtue of the Agreement on
May 7th, 1958. The Notice was given prior to notice
to plaintiffs of the Option to the Church.
Under the Agreement, in order to purchase defendants had to elect to do so, and within 120 days from the
date of the election pay cash to plaintiffs whose interest
was being purchased. On the 11th of September, 1959,
defendants notified plaintiffs that they would grant an
offset against moneys coming from the sale of the prop~
erty in the amount of $1597.79 (See Exhibit 20-D).
The amount of $1597.79 is the net payn1ent to the
Mills on the principal amount owing out of the down
payment of $3,000.00. This sum does not take into consideration the amounts which the plaintiffs had paid
on defendants' account during the joint operation which
the Court determined was an additional $1754.11.
Plaintiffs contend that if defendants did exercise
their right to purchase the interest of plaintiffs in the
property, a tender of less than one-half of the correct
amount would be ineffectual and without any force or
effect.
The rule of law concerning tenders seems to be
relatively clear. It is held generally that in order to
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constitute a valid tender, the tenderer must offer a
specific amount which must include all that the tenderee
is entitled to, and the tender of less than the amount due
is insufficient, the insignificance of the deficiency generally being immaterial. See: Cameron County Water
Improvement District No. 8 vs. De La Vergne Engine
Company, 100 F. 2d. 523; Equitable Life Assurance
Society of U.S. vs. Boothe, 160 Ore. 679, 86 P. 2d. 960;
J( elley vs. Clark, 23 Ida. 1; 129 Pac. 921; AdvanceRumely Thresher Co., vs. Hess, 85 Mont. 29·3; 279 Pac.
236; Wilbur vs. Taylor 154 Wash. 282; 282 Pac. 65;
Frands vs. Brown, 22 Wyo. 528, 145 Pac. 750; 86 C.J.S.
P. 562, Sub. Sec. No. 7; 62 C.J., P. 660, Sub. Sec. No. 6.
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that at the time of
trial neither of the parties had exercised properly, sufficiently, or effectively, the rights granted by the Agreement between them to purchase the interest of the other.
At the time of trial both parties were the owners of the
interests created by the Agreement of May 7th, 1958.
Out of the sale price of the property the balance
owing Mills had been paid in full, which was more than
the $30,000.00 which the contract required to be paid by
plaintiffs. It is the position of plaintiffs that at the time
· of the tender in September, 1959, proper distribution
between the parties of the moneys realized from the
sale of the joint property was all that could remain
to be done.
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The Court found that there was never any forfeiture
of plaintiffs' interests. It is submitted that there was
never any sufficient tender by defendants to purchase
the interests of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs owned the
interest created by the sale agreement of May 7th, 1958
up to the date of trial.
POINT II
.NT 'THE TIME OF THE GRANTING OF THE OPTION
TO PURCHASE, AND ITS EXERCISE, PLAINTIFFS AND
DEFENDANTS WERE JOINT OWNERS OF THE PROPERTY, AND PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF
OF THE NET PROFIT REALIZED ON THE SALE.

Under the terms of the Agreement between the
parties, plaintiffs agree to purchase a one-half interest
in the property at Summit County which defendants
were buying from parties named "Mills". For this onehalf interest, plaintiffs agreed to pay $30,000.00. The
payments were to be made semi-annually on the 1st of
October, and the 1st of April, in the amount of $1500.00,
each payment. Plaintiffs paid $3,000.00 down at the time
of the execution of the Agreement. This sum represented
the payments due on October 1st, 1957 and April 1st,
1958.
Plaintiffs went into possession of the property and
operated it on behalf of themselves and the defendants
during the summer of 1958, and were still in possession
when the property was sold and transferred to the
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Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in the summer of 1959. Defendants placed on the property livestock
which were cared for and handled by plaintiffs. During
the surmner of 1958 and through the fall and early spring
of 1959, plaintiffs paid the joint operational expense.
The Court found that expenses paid prior to May
7th, 1958 would not be allowed as against the joint
account but that all expenses paid thereafter which
were in the interest of the joint account would be credited
to the joint account.
The amount of joint expenses paid by the plaintiffs
and for which they were granted credit by the Court was
$3498.25. The Court found plaintiffs were entitled to
a $1754.11 credit for payments made on behalf of the
defendants during the joint operation time.
The April, 1959 payment was tendered to defendants, but refused by them upon the ground and for the
reason that they believed the plaintiffs had lost all
interest in the property by not paying an additional
$1500.00 on the 1st of October. Plaintiffs tendered this
payment late even though they had paid on defendants'
behalf more than the amount of the payment.
The Court found the attempts to forfeit the interest
of plaintiffs in the property were ineffectual and that
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plaintiffs and defendants were jointly interested in the
property up to the 14th of May, 1959.
At no place in the Agreement of May 7th, 1958 did
the parties specifically provide as to what the situation
would be if, during the life of the agreement and while
all of the parties were jointly interested, the property
was sold by the parties and a profit or loss realized over
the agreed value of the premises which was $60,000.00.
This deficiency in the Agreement is the basic problem
that was submitted to the Trial Court and is necessary
of resolution in this Court.
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that after the contract of May 7th, 1958 had been signed and the performance of the contract commenced by plaintiffs each of
the parties were the equitable owners of a one-half
interest in the contract with Mills and the property at
Park City.
The signing of the contract created in plaintiffs
an interest in real property subject to their performance
of the terms of the Agremnent, and created a right in
the defendants to receive the unpaid balance under the
Agreement. This ownership, plaintiffs submit, continued
up to and through the date when the property was sold
to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and
a profit realized on the sale over and above the agreed
value by the parties of $60,000.00.
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rrhe law has been long established that a party
to a Contract of Sale of land under equitable principle
owns what under the Contract he would receive upon
performance of the contract.
. The earliest U. S. case is Craig v. Leslve, et al., 3
Wheat. 562, 4 L. Ed. 460, wherein the United States
Supreme Court held:
"Washington, Judge :

* * * In the case of Fletcher v. Ashburner (1
Bro. Ch. Cas. 497) the master of the roll says
the 'nothing is better established than this principle, that money directed to be employed in the
purchase of land, and land directed to be sold
and turned into money, are to be considered as
that species of property into which they are
directed to be converted, and this in whatever
manner the direction is given.' He adds 'the
owner of the fund, or the contracting parties
may make land money, or money land. The cases
establish this rule universally." This declaration
is well warranted by the cases to which the master
of the rolls refers, as well as by many others.
See Dougherty v. Bull, 2 P. Wms. 320; Yeates v.
Compton, Id. 358: Trelawney v. Booth, 2 Atk.
307.
The principle upon which the whole of this
doctrine is founded is, that a court of equity,
regarding the substance, and not the mere forms
and circumstances of agreements and other instruments, considers things directed or agreed
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to be done, as having been actually performed
where nothing has intervened which ought to
prevent a performance. This qualification of the
more concise and general rule, that equity considers that to be done which is agreed to be
done, will comprehend the cases which come under
this head of equity." (p. 463) ."
A recent decision reciting the same principle is
Leedy vs. Ellis County Fair Ass'n, 188 Okl. 348, 110
P. 2d. 1099, wherein the Court stated:
"The contract purports on its face to be an
immediate sale of the premises in question. The
equitable title in the land passed thereunder to
Ralph R. Porter and is now owned by plaintiff.·
In such case the vendor and the purchaser occupy
a fiduciary relationship toward each other. The
vendor is trustee of the land for the purchaser,
and the purchaser is trustee of the purchase
money for the Vendor. Dunn vs. Y akish, 10 Okl.
388, 61 Pac. 926; Rarnra v. Mitchell, 133 Okl.
264, 271 Pac. 1042. In the Dunn case the rule
was stated as follows : 'Equity treats things
agreed to be done as actually performed, and
when real estate is sold under a valid contract,
the deed executed at a future day, the equitable
title passes at once to the vendee, and equity
treats the vendor as a trustee for the purchaser
of the estate sold, and the purchaser as a trustee
of the purchase 1noney for the vendor."
See also: Elliot vs. McCombs, 17 C. 2d. 23, 109 P.
2d. 329; Trcrul-wcll vs. Henderson, 58 N.\Y. 230, 269 P.
2d. 1108; Virgini'a Ship Building Corp. vs. U.S. Ship-
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ping Board Emerg·ency Fleet Corp., 292 Fed. 440; Cert.
Denied. 48 S. Ct. 305, 276 U.S. 625; 72 L. Ed. 738;
Stralwn vs. Haynes, 33 Ariz. 128, 262 Pac. 995; Desimone
vs. Spencer, 51 W. 2d. 412, 318 P. 2d. 959; 21 C.J.,
P. 201; 30 C.J.S., P. 511.
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence· 5th Edition, Volume 4, Page 479, Section 1161, states the rule as follows :
"Sec. 1161.-Under a Contract of Sale.-A
contract of sale, if all the terms are agreed upon,
also operates as a conversion of the property,
the vendor becoming a trustee of the purchasemoney for the vendor (see Sees. 368, 372). In
order to work a conversion, the contract must
be valid and binding, free from inequitable imperfections, and such as a Court of equity will
specifically enforce against an unwilling purchaser. The fact that the contract of purchase
is entirely at the option of the purchaser does
not prevent its working a conversion, if he avails
himself of the option. (See Sees. 1163)."
When the Option was granted by defendant, Elmo
England, to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, to purchase the property for $75,000.00, he acted
on behalf of the joint operation even though plaintiffs
were kept in ignorance of the action by England. See :
Holland vs. Morton, 10 Utah 2d. 390, 353 P. 2d. 989.
The general rule seems to be that although a Fiduciary relationship does not, strictly speaking, exist between
tenants in common by reason of the tenancy, there is
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such a relationship of trust and confidence that each cotenant has a duty to sustain, or at least not act in
hostility of the commqn interest of the parties. 86 C.J.S.
p. 376, Section 17.

One tenant in common will not he permitted to take
advantage of the other, nor will one co-tenant, where
all must act in unison, be permitted to obtain a secret
profit to the disadvantage of the other co-tenant.

See Wallace vs. Brooks, 194 Okl. 137, 147 P. 2d. 784.
This case involved the joint interest in mineral rights
on property. "B" sold the property to "A", reserved a
one-half interest in the mineral rights on the property.
"A" placed a mortgage on the property, then permitted
the mortgagee to foreclose the mortgage. "A" furnished
the funds to his daughter to purchase at the foreclosure
sale the title to the property. In this manner, it was
planned that "B's" one-half interest in the mineral rights
would be extinguished and the purchaser at the foreclosure sale obtain all the mineral rights. Subsequently,
"B" sued to have his mineral rights preserved. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that no tenant in common
may act in hostility to the other's title and that the
daughter of "A" acquired the title on behalf of the joint
tenants and all would benefit and ''B" was entitled to
his one-half of the mineral rights under the new ownership.
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Freeman, on Co-tenancy, and Partition, 2n·d Ed.
Secti·on 154, discusses the mutual rights and obligations
of co-tenants and states as follows:
"A co-tenant cannot take advantage of any
defect in the common title by purchasing an outstanding title, or encumbrance, and asserting it
against his companion in interest. The purchase
is notwithstanding his design to the contrary,
is for the common benefit of all the co-tenants.
"The legal title acquired by him is held in
trust for the others if they choose within a
reasonable time to claim the bene.:fits of the purchase by contributing or offering to contribute
their portion of the purchase money."
See also, cases citing and upholding the rule stated:
Sbevenson vs. Boyd, 153 Cal. 630; 96 P. 284; 19 LRA NS
525. Dwiyht vs. Waldron, 96 Wash. 150; Harrison vs.
Cole, 50 Colo. 470, 116 Pac. 1123; Stvanson vs. Sti:anson,
40 So. Dak. 322; 167 N.W. 237, 6 ALR 280. Turner vs.
Simpson, 313 Ky. 780, 233 SW 2d. 528.
A very interesting case upholding the rule as between joint tenants is Berghous vs. B·erghous, 255 App.
Div. 851, 7 N.Y.S. 2d. 435, aff. 280 N.Y. 799·, 21 NE 2d.
623. In this case two brothers owned property as tenants
in common, and agreed to sell to a corporation for
$15,000.00. Brother "A" unbeknown to brother "B" was
the owner of the dummy purchaser. It was held that
brother "B" could set aside the sale even though the only
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relationship was that of tenants in common. The cotenant was required by the relationship to disclose to
his co-tenant the true name of the purchaser and the
relationship that did exist between said purchaser and
the co-tenant.
It is respectfully submitted by plaintiffs that when
Elmo England granted the option to the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to purchase the jointly
owned property he acted on behalf of the joint operation,
and the benefits of said offer accrued to plaintiffs as
co-tenants. Plaintiffs were entitled to share in the proportion to their ownership in the sale price. The only
way in which they could be deprived of their one-half
interest is if this Court should hold that the exercise
on the 14th of May, 1959 by the defendants of their rights
to purchase the interests of plaintiffs in the property
was a valid, effective and lawful action.
It is respectfully submitted that under the doctrine
of equitable conversion plaintiffs were the owners of
an interest in real property during the period that they
operated jointly with the defendants; that at no time
did that interest cease or determine prior to the sale to
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and at
the time of the sale, since they were a half interest
owner in the property, they were entitled to one-half
of the net profits derived from the sale. The Court, by
its determination that they were not entitled to share
in the profits of the sale made error of law.
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CONCLUSION
The Court should reverse the judgment of the Trial
Court and should order the entry of judgment awarding
plaintiffs one-half the profits on the sale to the Church.
Respectfully submitted,

KING AND HUGHES
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs and Appellants
By Dwight L. King
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